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THE COMPLEX IMPLICATIONS OF
FINTECH FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION
HEATHER HUGHES*

I
INTRODUCTION

Emerging financial technologies, or "fintech," such as cryptocurrencies,
online mobile banking, crowd funding, blockchain-based transaction platforms,
and the like, have potential to expand financial inclusion.' They can create access
to banking services, investment possibilities, and capital for those currently
underserved in these regards.2 At the same time, new technologies have the

Copyright ©2021 by Heather Hughes.
This Article is also available online at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
* Professor, American University, Washington College of Law. I want to thank, for their very helpful
comments, Ken Anderson, David Snyder, Brandon Weiss, Jonas Anderson, Hilary Allen, Jonathan
Baker, Michael Carroll, Jerry Comizio, and Lewis Grossman.
1. In keeping with the definitional guidelines of this symposium, "financial inclusion" means
widespread deposit-account ownership and access to payments services. Steven L. Schwarcz & Theodore
L. Leonhardt, Scoping and Defining FinancialInclusion, Access to Credit, and Sustainable Finance, 84
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2021, at 1, 5. Relatedly, "access to credit" means availability of
adequate loan funding on reasonable terms, especially for aspiring entrepreneurs from underserved
groups. Id. at 9. "Sustainable finance" means continuously providing financial inclusion and access to
credit. Id. at 10.
2. Recent scholarship discusses the potential, but also concerns, for financial inclusion that fintech
platforms present, including concerns about biased algorithms that produce discriminatory results and
about data privacy. See generally Matthew Aaron Chou, Note: What's in the "Black Box"? Balancing
Financial Inclusion and Privacy in Digital Consumer Lending, 69 DUKE L.J. 1183 (2020); Adam
Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders' Use of Big Data, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3
(2018); Sonia K. Katyal, PrivateAccountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54
(2019) (noting the tension between Artificial Intelligence and civil rights); Lauren Kirchner, When
Discrimination Is Baked Into Algorithms, ATLANTIC (Sept. 6, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/
business/archive/2015/09/discrimination-algorithms-disparate-impact/403969
[https://perma.cc/V4JG3RMW]; Lizzie R. Hobbs, Facebook's Libra: The Social Media Giant's Pursuit of Global Financial
Inclusion, 24 N.C. BANKING INST. 331 (2020); A. DEMIRGfQ-KUNT, LEORA KLAPPER, DOROTHE
SINGER, SANIYA ANSAR & JAKE HESS, WORLD BANK GRP., THE GLOBAL FINDEX DATABASE 2017:
MEASURING FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND THE FINTECH REVOLUTION
4 (2018), https://

globalfindex.worldbank.org [https://perma.cc/B49W-7ZYU]; DOUGLAS W. ARNER, ROSS P. BUCKLEY
& DIRK A. ZETZSCHE, ALL. FOR FIN. INCLUSION, FINTECH FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION: A
FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL FINANCIAL TRANSFORMATION (2018), https://www.afi-global.org/sites/

default/files/publications/2018-09/AFIFinTechSpecial%20ReportAWdigital.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Z3X3-2UG5]; Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, Fintech Lending: FinancialInclusion, Risk Pricing,
and Alternative Information 1, 7-17 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 17-17, 2017) https://
www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-anddata/publications/working-papers/2017/wp7-17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q77H-QLKT] (noting the potential for alternative data to improve financial
inclusion); Beyond Silk Road:PotentialRisks, Threats, and Promisesof Virtual Currency:HearingBefore
the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 5 (2013) (statement of Patrick
Murck, General Counsel, Bitcoin Foundation), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=4cd1ff12312d-429f-aa41-1d77034ec5a8 [https://perma.cc/K28L-WPQ8] ("We believe Bitcoin holds out a number
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potential to aggravate systemic risk.3 For individuals and small businesses, the
possibilities that emerging fintech platforms create are exciting.4 But, from a
macro perspective, what are the implications for financial inclusion and
sustainability of systemic risks that fintech may compound?
This Article builds upon recent scholarship on fintech, systemic risk, and
financial regulation by (i) discussing two ways in which blockchain-based market
activity may elevate systemic risk; (ii) contending that increased systemic risk
threatens financial inclusion and sustainability; and (iii) arguing that, as
blockchain-based financial activity evolves, we should not overlook the
regulatory potential of private-law doctrines and concepts. Other scholars have
articulated how fintech is poised to undermine the power dynamic between
public and private actors that originated with the New Deal, presenting a grave

public policy challenge.' In engaging this public policy challenge, along with
considering top-down regulatory options, lawmakers should articulate how
blockchain-based transactions comport with contract, property, and entity laws.
Failure to do so could aggravate fintech's effects on systemic risk. Market
practices could proliferate despite incoherent or inconsistent legal grounding,
making it difficult for regulators to enforce longstanding norms that private-law
rules embody.
Commentators speculate that extensive market activity will transpire on
blockchain-enabled platforms. This Article does not take a position on whether
this is true or how soon developments will materialize. The purpose, here, is to
consider implications of fintech, given possibilities that technology presents.
Blockchain-based financial activity has the potential to compound risks to
market stability. First, it facilitates synthesizing financial assets into obtuse
financial products, the trading of which can escalate in volume and speed
seemingly without limit. 6 Second, it enables self-executing transactions that may

&

of powerfully beneficial social and economic outcomes, including global financial inclusion, enhanced
personal liberty and dignity, improved financial privacy, and a stable money supply for people in
countries where monetary instability may threaten prosperity and even peace."); EVA WOLKOWITZ
SARAH PARKER, CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, BIG DATA, BIG POTENTIAL: HARNESSING DATA
TECHNOLOGY FOR THE UNDERSERVED MARKET (2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/cfsi-innovation-

files/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/13062352/Big-Data-Big-Potential-Harnessing-Data-Technology-forthe-Underserved-Market.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PHS-Z39Y]; Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big
Data'sDisparateImpact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016).
3. See generally Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal:FinTech as a Systemic Phenomenon, 36
YALE J. ON REG. 735, 790-91 (2019) (arguing that fintech applications may shift the fundamental balance
of the public and private roles in the financial sector, thus increasing systemic risk); Angela Walch, The
Bitcoin Blockchain as FinancialMarket Infrastructure:A Considerationof OperationalRisk, 18 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 837, 855-82 (2015); Heather Hughes, Blockchain and the Future of Secured
TransactionsLaw, 3 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL'Y 21 (2020); Hilary J. Allen, Driverless Finance, 10
HARV. Bus. L. REV. 157 (2020); William Magnuson, RegulatingFintech, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1167 (2018).
4. For example, fintech platforms can provide credit by using artificial intelligence underwriting
and alternative data. See Christopher K. Odinet, Securitizing DigitalDebts, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 477, 49094 (2020).
5. Omarova, supra note 3; see infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
6. Omarova, supra note 3.
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defy private law doctrines and regulatory requirements in ways that are difficult
to undo.7 Each of these attributes of blockchain-based financial markets
aggravates systemic risk.8
Macro-level regulatory concerns presented by emerging platforms for
financial activity implicate financial inclusion and sustainability. If the financial
crisis of 2007-2008 is any guide, systemic financial instability can exacerbate the
wealth gap and ultimately set back groups that, in theory, might have benefitted
from the greater access to credit associated with market expansion. Financial
crises hit those who are struggling harder than those who are wealthy, resulting
in diminished financial inclusion and sustainability.
With respect to some market practices, we can trace a relationship between
systemic risk concerns and efforts at financial inclusion for individual investors.
For example, the expansion of sub-prime mortgage products in the early 2000s
was intended, at least in theory and in part, to create access to credit to purchase
homes for people who could not access this market using more traditional
mortgage products.9 But the secondary market appetite for mortgage-backed
securities and the rapid origination of higher-risk mortgage products had the
effect, when markets failed, of further excluding many homeowners whose
attempts at financial inclusion resulted in foreclosure.
While individual investor-orientated transactions enabled by blockchain that
rely on secondary market capital do exist, this Article is not about the connection
between products designed to increase inclusion but that also contribute to
systemic risk. Rather, it is about how blockchain-based transactions can
aggravate systemic risk, and the phenomenon that economic downturns caused
by excessive systemic risk erode financial inclusion and sustainability. For
example, Christopher Odinet has observed that consumer and small businessoriented fintech lending services rely on securitization of these loans (that are
underwritten with algorithms) to access capital. 0 This market activity directly
links the creation of complex, fintech-based financial products to financial
services associated with inclusion. But other fintech market practices are not

7. See Hughes, supra note 3 (discussing self-executing transactions and private-law norms); Allen,
supra note 3 (discussing self-executing transactions, algorithmic complexity, and regulatory
requirements). Blockchain-based market activity also brings operational risk inherent in software and
decentralization (depending on whether the blockchain is permissioned and how it is administered). See
Walch, supra note 3.
8. See infra Part II.
9. For example, the George W. Bush administration made explicit the policy objective of
increasing rates of home ownership among minorities. Subprime mortgage lending enables access to
credit and is superior in most instances to sale-leaseback or installment sale alternatives to traditional
mortgage lending. Subprime lending did not necessitate increased predatory lending, the development
of excessively complex financial products, or sloppy underwriting practices. Yet many home buyers
ended up in foreclosure for a mix of reasons including misleading lending practices, loss of value to their
homes due to overall market decline, lack of understanding of loan terms, or changed circumstances. See
generally, FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 83-213 (2011),

govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [https://perma.cc/XE52-NPNX].
10. Odinet, supra note 4.
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necessarily linked directly to expanding retail products or individual investing.
Regardless, the consequences of a failure of a systemically significant financial
institution, or of widespread market failure, do affect individuals and can
undermine financial inclusion and sustainability.
Policy makers have been considering for some years now how regulation can
provide adequate consumer and investor protection in the context of emerging
fintech platforms without stifling the potential for innovation and financial
inclusion. Financial regulation to address systemic risk-the soundness of
systemically significant financial institutions and the like-is often thought of as
a field apart from investor protection regulation to mitigate risks to consumers
and small businesses using emerging platforms. But both implicate the question
of whether and how emerging financial technologies will affect financial inclusion
and financial sustainability."
Part II of this Article describes a specific fintech development: blockchainbased financial transactions, or smart contracts for trade transactions executed
on a distributed ledger. This Part describes what is new about this emerging
financial technology that warrants heightened vigilance from a regulatory
perspective and how this technology aggravates systemic risk. Part III assesses
the relationship between systemic risk and financial inclusion. The potential for
blockchain technology to expand financial inclusion is tremendous, but the
macro-level financial concerns that this technology presents have complex
implications for financial inclusion and sustainability. Part IV discusses
regulation of market activity on emerging platforms, focusing on the importance
of private-law rules. Private-law doctrines and concepts contribute to systemic
stability in important ways that policymakers sometimes overlook." For
example, the limitations on freedom of contract imposed by the property concept
of numerus clausus13 prevent market actors from circumventing various
regulatory requirements. 4 Blockchain-based smart contracts can conflate
contract and property-law functions and can make security interests and entities
indistinguishable." How do we ensure that private-law norms that contribute to
11. In addition, these fields are linked in contexts where practices like securitization involve
consumer or small business loans. See Odinet, supra note 4 at 485 (showing "how fintech is causing a
major convergence between policies associated with consumer protection (licensing, disclosures, fairness,
etc.) on the one hand and those dealing with commercial and corporate finance (i.e., the capital markets,
risk, and failure) on the other"); Erik F. Gerding, The Subprime Crisis and the Link Between Consumer
FinancialProtection and Systemic Risk, 4 FLA. INT'L U.L. REV., 435, 436 (2009) (observing the oftenoverlooked connection between "regulations designed to protect consumers and regulations intended to
protect financial markets from the collapse of financial institutions").
12. See Heather Hughes, Financial Product Complexity, Moral Hazard, and the Private Law, 20
STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 179, 210-19 (2015) [hereinafter FinancialProduct Complexity, Moral Hazard,
and the PrivateLaw].
13. Numerus clausus is the principle that the law will only enforce an interest as a property rightrather than a contract right-if it conforms to a limited number of generally accepted and standardized
forms. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 3-4 (2000); see also infra text accompanying notes 64-67.
14. Hughes, supra note 12, at 211-16.
15. See Hughes, supra note 3, at 17-23.
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systemic stability persist in fintech-enabled markets? How do we establish a
functional relationship between private market activity and collective welfare?
How we approach these broad, normative questions will determine whether
fintech developments yield greater financial inclusion and sustainability, or the
potential for worsening inequality and instability.

II
FINTECH AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES

The term fintech refers generally to technologies for financial services and
transactions and includes a variety of platforms and developments.
Developments in technology have at numerous junctures impacted financial
transactions and services. As legal scholars Chris Brummer and Yesha Yadav
state, contemporary fintech departs from past developments in that it "generally
(i) relies on the use of big data; (ii) involves complex algorithms and artificial
intelligence; and (iii) showcases a tendency to seek out disintermediation in
traditional financial services and supply chains by a nontraditional set of firms."16
This Article will focus primarily on one emerging financial technology: the
use of blockchain-based smart contracts for financial transactions. Blockchain
and smart contracts are distinct technologies that can function apart from each
other. It is the use of blockchain platforms for the expression and execution of
smart contracts that presents wide-ranging possibilities for financial markets. It
is this financial technology that promises lower-cost, faster settlements in
financial markets-offering the potential for lower costs of capital that can foster
financial inclusion but also the potential for aggravated systemic risk.
A blockchain is a distributed ledger that records transactions.' When a ledger
is distributed, it means that there is no master copy: any participant may maintain
a copy of the ledger and yet all participants have confidence that theirs matches
all other copies.18 Participants can trust the accuracy of a ledger without reference
to a master copy or central authority; this is the innovation of blockchain
16. Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintechand the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235 (2019),
at n.18.
17. All blockchains are distributed ledgers, but not all distributed ledgers fit neatly into the category
"blockchain." The Corda system for transactions among regulated financial institutions, for example, is
a distributed ledger that uses a data structure that is distinct from a blockchain. See Richard Gendal
Brown, Introducing R3 CordaTM: A Distributed Ledger Designed for Financial Services, GENDAL.ME
(Apr. 5, 2016), https://gendal.me/2016/04/05/introducing-r3-corda-a-distributed-ledger-designed-forfinancial-services [https://perma.cc/674Y-D4ZW]. Despite its distinct data structure, commentators call
the R3 financial services consortium a "blockchain firm" and include it in the discussions of blockchain
technology. Walch notes that some have called expansive uses of the term blockchain "chainwashing"
using the word "blockchain" because of its market hype in contexts where "distributed ledger" would be
more accurate. See Angela Walch, The Path of the Blockchain Lexicon (and the Law), 36 REV. BANKING
& FIN. L. 713, 727 (2017). A member of the R3 consortium has called out this "chainwashing" in contexts
where companies either do not actually use blockchain technology, or do not need to use it to best serve
their customers. See id.; Tim Swanson, Chainwashing, GREAT WALL NUMBERS (Feb. 13, 2017),
https://www.ofnumbers.com/2017/02/13/chainwashing [https://perma.cc/7CFB-Z9U7].
18. Kevin Werbach, Trust, but Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the Law, 33 BERKLEY TECH. L.J.
488, 500 (2018).
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technology. People commonly refer to blockchain technology, blockchains, or the
blockchain.1 9 Or, they refer to distributed ledger technology (DLT), or shared
ledgers or consensus ledgers.2 Some commentators assert that the term
blockchain should refer only to public or permissionless ledgers, while others use
blockchain to mean any distributed ledger-open access or permissioned.2 1 All
blockchains are constituted by (i) a ledger,22 (ii) a network, 23 and (iii) consensus, 24
that is (iv) unalterable by feasible means.25 This Article uses the term blockchain
to refer to any platform constituted by these essential elements, regardless of
whether is it permissioned or fully decentralized.
Smart contracts are agreements that are self-executing and self-enforcing,
expressed in code.2 6 Different forms of blockchain-based smart contract

19. While currently there are numerous blockchains in operation, it is possible that in the future
there will be only one blockchain of consequence. Id., at 501. When commentators use "the blockchain,"
in some contexts it seems they are assuming such an outcome and referring to "the blockchain" as we
refer to "the Internet." In other contexts, "the blockchain" means the Bitcoin blockchain specifically,
since Bitcoin is the dominant platform. Werbach notes: "Bitcoin today remains the biggest platform in
terms of market capitalization of tokens, but its dominance appears to be waning. In twenty years, it
could be worth several trillion dollars, or zero." Id.
20. People use the word "blockchain" inconsistently, making the terminology surrounding this
technology highly confusing. See Walch, supra note 17, at 718 (describing the inconsistent and misleading
vocabulary surrounding blockchain and how the resulting confusion can affect regulation). The terms
blockchain and distributed ledger are not necessarily interchangeable. Commentators refer to a
"consensus ledger" as a ledger that does not keep track of a history of transactions but rather operates
according to a consensus generated on a ledger of accounts that is updated with new transactions at each
validation round. See id. at 719-20; Andrea Pinna & Wiebe Ruttenberg, DistributedLedger Technology
in Securities post-Trading, 9 (European Cent. Bank, Occasional Paper No. 172, Apr. 2016), https://
www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbopl72.en.pdf; Sebastien Meunier, Blockchain Technology -a
Very Special Kind of Distributed Database,MEDIUM (Dec. 29, 2016), https://medium.com/@sbmeunier/
blockchain-technology-a-very-special-kind-of-distributed-database-e63d00781118
[https://perma.cc/
AN44-3KBU] (describing the iterations of distributed ledger technology, including blockchain).
21. Walch, supra note 17, at 725.
22. "The ledger is the database that expands as it incorporates approved transactions. Transactions
are added to the ledger using cryptographic signatures and keys, and they are grouped into blocks. Each
block contains a cryptographic hash to the previous block, keeping the blocks in order." Hughes, supra
note 3, at 31.
23. "The network is the computer nodes running the software for the application-for example, the
nodes running the Bitcoin software, connected in a peer-to-peer network-where each node maintains a
complete copy of the blockchain. Each new transaction is broadcast to all nodes in the network. The
nodes add new blocks to the blockchain as transactions are validated." Id. at 32.
24. Consensus is how blockchains establish trust among untrustworthy participants in the absence
of a centralized authority or enforcement mechanism. On the Bitcoin network, for example, consensus is
generated with a process called mining. This consensus mechanism first executed by the Bitcoin
blockchain is commonly called "proof-of-work," or creating consensus with a "proof-of-work algorithm."
Many permissionless and some permissioned blockchains rely on proof-of-work algorithms. These
require considerable computing power (and energy) for their administration. Permissioned blockchains
may use a consensus mechanism other than proof-of-work. Hyperledger Fabric, for example, provides a
number of consensus algorithms available to participants who use a Hyperledger platform. The difficulty
of these algorithms, and the computational power they demand, varies. See id. at 32-33.
25. No one can alter a transaction once it is approved because the blocks are linked in a sequence
that cannot be feasibly altered. See id. at 31.
26. See Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contractsex Machina, 67 Duke L.J. 313, 313 n.2, 319-20
(2017). There are other definitions of smart contracts. Max Raskin defines them as "agreements wherein
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accomplish different ends. The smart contracts that this Article focuses on are
single smart contracts for trade transactions, executed on a decentralized ledger.
They reflect a "decentralized bond between two or more parties on the
blockchain," that operates in response to financial incentives.2 7
Blockchain-based smart contracts, as a platform for financial markets, can
compound risks to market stability. In recent scholarship Saule Omarova
identifies a prevailing narrative around fintech: that it makes transactions easier
and cheaper, through applied information science, in a normatively neutral way. 28
She challenges this narrative, asserting that fintech is a macro-level phenomenon
with normative and political implications. In a similar vein, Hilary Allen
identifies macro-level regulatory concerns surrounding fintech and discusses the
importance of ethics in the administration of tech-driven markets. 2 9
Omarova states that fintech is poised to be "the catalyst for a potentially
decisive shift in the underlying public-private balance of powers, competencies,
and roles in the financial system." 30 This underlying balance of powers in the U.S.
financial system has been formed, over time, in terms of what Omarova calls the
"New Deal settlement": a system of financial sector regulation that took shape
during the New Deal era and the essential premises of which have been replicated
and perpetuated in sophisticated regulatory infrastructure for systematic
oversight of financial markets. 31 The New Deal settlement embodies normative
judgments about the correct balance between private freedom and public control
in financial markets:

.

[P]rivate market actors retain control over substantive decisions on how to allocate
financial capital to various productive uses-and thus the power to determine the
overall volume and structure of financial claims in the system. The public . .. bears the
primary responsibility for maintaining the overall stability of the financial system. . .

execution is automated, usually by computers." Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts,
1 Geo. L. Tech. Rev. 305, 306 (2017). Jeremy Sklaroff states that "[s]mart contracts are decentralized
agreements built in computer code and stored on a blockchain." Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Comment, Smart
Contracts and The Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 263, 263 (2017). See also Ai Deng, Smart
Contracts and Blockchains: Steroidfor Collusion? 1 (Sept. 11, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3187010
[https://perma.cc/4T44-7VSP]; Christopher D. Clack Vikram A. Bakshi & Lee Braine, Smart Contract
Templates: Foundations, Design Landscape and Research Directions 2 (Aug. 4, 2016) (unpublished
manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1608.00771.pdf ("A smart contract is an automatable and enforceable
agreement. Automatable by computer, although some parts may require human input and control.
Enforceable by either legal enforcement of rights and obligations or tamper-proof execution.");
Alexander Savelyev, ContractLaw 2.0: "Smart" Contractsas the Beginning of the End of Classic Contract
Law 7 (Nat'l Res. U. Higher Sch. of Econs., Paper No. WP BRP 71/LAW/2016, 2016), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2885241 [https://perma.cc/M84X-UD42] ("Smart contract is an agreement whose execution is
automated.").
27. JP Buntinx, What is a DApp?, MERKLE, https://themerkle.com/what-is-a-dapp [https://perma.cc/
DV9G-P8GJ] (last updated Jan. 19, 2017).
28. Omarova, supra note 3.
29. See generally Allen, supra note 3, at 174-95, 202 (discussing various "potential threats to
financial stability" from algorithmic finance, including ethical concerns surrounding artificial intelligence
and machine learning).
30. Omarova, supra note 3 at 735.
31. See id. at 746-54.
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[R]egulation constrains market participants' ability to generate excessive system-wide
risks in pursuit of private profits. 2

This New Deal settlement embodies a contestable, unstable boundary between
public and private that has been continuously renegotiated as market actors press
for expanded freedoms to create and trade financial claims.
The fact that the financial system's center of gravity has shifted from primary
to secondary markets, coupled with excessive risk generation and untethered
growth within secondary markets, has undermined the New Deal settlement. 33
The advent of blockchain-based platforms for financial markets threatens to
further diminish it, leaving no sense of how, in the future, we will achieve a
functional balance of private risk-taking and public welfare. 34 This is because
blockchain-based platforms enable increasingly complex "pooling and layering
of claims, and acceleration and compression of trades"-the mechanisms with
which market actors achieve continuous synthesizing of tradable financial assets
and increasing volume and speed of trading activity. 35 In the face of proliferating
private market activity of this nature, the public side of the New Deal settlement
is increasingly challenged to accommodate privately created claims while
managing systemic risks. Given this dynamic, Omarova argues, fintech-with its
macro-level financial implications-presents a "public policy challenge of the
highest order." 36
In addition to risk associated with increased synthesizing of claims and scaling
up of trading activity, blockchain-based smart contracts aggravate systemic risk
by detaching financial transactions from private law rules and norms that
integrate important policy choices into market activity. 37 Blockchain-based
transactions may defy private law doctrines in ways that are difficult to undo. 38
Blockchain-based smart contracts are a device for transacting, not a type of
transaction. But this device has a legal effect in that it dedicates assets to specific
transactional counterparties-it accomplishes asset partitioning. 39 Regulators
and policymakers tend to treat this technology as a new platform for executing
established forms of transactions. But blockchain-based smart contracts can be
difficult to fit into existing legal frameworks because their functionality conflates
contract and property law devices, and mimics both security interests and
entities." As such, emerging platforms enable market actors to exploit the
difficulty of challenging a transaction's characterization, enabling them to sidestep statutory boundaries that reflect longstanding political choices.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 740.
See id. at 756-59.
See id. at 790-92.
Id. at 741; see generally Allen, supra note 3.
Omarova, supra note 3 at 743.
See Hughes, supra note at 3, at 3.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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For example, it may be possible for a fintech-enabled transaction to assign
assets to a special purpose entity for purposes of securitization with a high degree
of recourse that, if subject to a characterization challenge, would make the assets
reachable by the originator's creditors. In the traditional or low-tech world,
creditors-potentially employees, suppliers, or tort claimants-would have,
through the bankruptcy process, a legal point of intervention at which to
challenge the true-sale status of an assignment for the issuance of asset-backed
securities. In a fintech-enabled transaction, however, there may be no such legal
intervention point. The code expressing the transaction may be written to
automatically transfer assets to the investors in asset-backed securities upon the
occurrence of an originator bankruptcy. The originator may try to contest and
eventually undo the disposition, but there is no possibility of an order permitting
access to the assets pending the determination of their status in private-law
terms.4
The narrative around legal treatment of blockchain-based smart contracts
implies that existing legal infrastructure can accommodate this market activity so
long as laws are sufficiently technology neutral. As Omarova observes, the
fintech narrative focuses on concrete, transactional aspects of finance and how
fintech can provide micro-level "win-wins" within the financial system.42 But
fintech is introducing new mechanisms for executing transactions-more quickly
and securely-that the law will recognize and interpret. This narrative obscures
the complexity of applying established legal doctrines to transactions which can
(i) defy straightforward legal characterization, and (ii) force transacting parties
to contest outcomes only after execution, in a remedial posture. 43 The cumulative
effect of this complexity could be markets that expand despite inconsistent or
incoherent legal status, undermining the capacity to administer, in the future,
rules designed to curtail problematic risks and externalities."
In other words, disregard of private-law rules invites systemic risk. Investors
in mortgage-backed securities suffered, surrounding the 2007-2008 crisis, from
uncertainty regarding the legal status of assets collateralizing issuances.4 5 For
another example, the market prominence of securities repurchase agreements or
"repos" led lawmakers to define these agreements as sales despite the fact that
they function as extensions of credit.4 6 This sale treatment, based on form and
regardless of economic substance, helped to catalyze a repo run on banks that

41. Cf In re LTV Steel Co., Inc., 274 B.R. 278, 285-86 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) (rejecting a
creditor's motion for relief from an interim order permitting originator access to securitized accounts
receivable).
42. Omarova, supra note 3.
43. See Hughes, supra note 3.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 57.
46. See id. at 58.
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scholars identify as a central cause of the financial crisis. 47 If lawmakers decline
to articulate how blockchain-based transactions implicate contract, property, and
entity laws before these transactions become dominant and entrenched, markets
could defy regulators' ability to enforce well-established legal norms.

III
FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND SYSTEMIC RISK

The relationship between systemic risk, fintech, and financial inclusion is
complex. The very real prospects for increasing access to financial services and
credit for individuals, and access to capital for small businesses, are exciting.4 8
This is especially true from a global perspective. But fintech may have ominous
repercussions 49 for financial inclusion if lawmakers do not take seriously the
macro-level policy questions surrounding financial regulation, and the questions
surrounding legal treatment of technology-enabled transactions, that emerging
platforms for financial markets present. If the last financial crisis is any guide,
excessive systemic risk and resulting market failures undermine financial
inclusion and sustainability. They most hurt those striving for financial stability
and upward mobility.
Older fintech developments-like the software that enables securitization,
tranches, et cetera-were applied in contexts involving policy choices made
expressly with financial inclusion in mind (that is, the sub-prime mortgage
market).50 But the systemic risk and market failure that resulted had the effect of
exacerbating the wealth gap and undermining financial inclusion and
sustainability.
With respect to new fintech developments-such as AI-based underwriting
of loans -the promise of expanding access to credit by looking beyond traditional
credit score and income information holds promise for financial inclusion. These
kinds of loans are funded by capital markets and, because underwriting is
accomplished with Al and algorithms, they are obtuse.5' It is very difficult for a
purchaser of securities to assess or have any insight into the underwriting criteria
for the loans backing the securities.52 In the event that securitization of fintech-

47. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J. FIN. ECON.
425, 447-48 (2012) (hypothesizing that the bankruptcy safe harbor for repo transactions aggravated the
economic downturn).
48. See Odinet, supra note 4.
49. Others have focused on the problematic implications of fintech for financial inclusion as a
function of discrimination by algorithms coded with or resulting in bias. See supra note 2. Here, the
concern is distributional effects of market failures due to fintech-based financial activity.
50. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
51. See Odinet, supra note 4 at 490.
52. See id. at 514 (explaining the difficulty of comprehending the underwriting done with Al because
of the complexity of the data).
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based loans expands, the risk that the opacity and complexity of these loans
present could contribute to systemic risk. 53
The systemic risks that can threaten financial inclusion and sustainability are
not limited to cases in which financial products derive from access-oriented
lending activity. This Article concerns systemic risk generally-as related to any
technology-enabled lowering of costs of capital by synthesizing claims or by
eliminating characterization challenges. The concern is that the fall-out of
excessive systemic risk hits harder people who are struggling for access to credit
or capital for small businesses.
The point, here, is not to contemplate a trade-off between access-enabling
fintech developments and increased risk to lower income people associated with
the possibility of widespread economic downturn. Rather, it is to illustrate the
multi-faceted implications of fintech for financial inclusion and sustainability.

IV
LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND MARKETS

At the heart of this inquiry into the implications of fintech for financial
inclusion and sustainability is the question of how we conceive of the relationship
between law and markets. Omarova speaks of a public and private dynamic in
which private market actors generate financial claims and public agencies
monitor and control for excessive risks. My own work casts the private law as the
legal infrastructure of markets, without which there would be no enforceable
claims to trade.54
Referring to financial market dynamics surrounding the pooling and layering
of financial assets and acceleration and compression of financial transactions,
Omarova warns: "If (or when?) fintech delivers on its promise to make these
mechanisms virtually frictionless, thus taking their operation to a qualitatively
different level, the financial market will completely forsake the frail confines of
the New Deal settlement. We need to start thinking seriously about what should
replace it." 5 5 Erosion of the New Deal settlement implies a waning capacity of
regulatory agencies to monitor and control private market actors. In response,
53. See id. at 515 (discussing how acceptance of Al underwriting, without understanding it, will
increase risk).
54. See generally Heather Hughes, FinancialProduct Complexity, Moral Hazard, and the Private
Law, 20 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 179 (2015) (articulating a shift from a contract-law to a property-law
framework for regulating transactional complexity after the financial crisis); Heather Hughes, Reforming
the True-Sale Doctrine,36 YALE J. ON REG. BULLETIN 51, (2018) [hereinafter, Reforming the True-Sale
Doctrine] (arguing that state lawmakers should reform true-sale rules to include price in the analysis);
Heather Hughes, Property and the True-Sale Doctrine, 19 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 870 (2017) [hereinafter
Property and the True-Sale Doctrine] (mapping arguments about the efficiency of securitization to
varying formulations of the true-sale doctrine).
55. New Tech v. New Deal, supra note 3, at 793. She has begun to answer her own call in a series of
articles, on her own and with Bob Hockett. The task of thinking seriously about what will replace the
public/ private boundaries in a fintech-driven, post New Deal settlement world requires taking up deep
normative questions about what kinds of finance there should be, and what finance and financial systems
should do in a republic.
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Omarova and others tend to focus on fortifying or re-configuring federal
regulatory bodies and regulatory strategies. 56
But in thinking seriously about what should replace the New Deal settlement,
we should not overlook the regulatory potential of state laws, especially the
common law and commercial laws. Lawmakers should not be afraid to define
new technology-enabled market practices and asset classes in private-law terms.
While legal concepts will need to evolve to accommodate new practices, leaving
technologies of legal import beyond private-law classification altogether invites
a lack of clarity and a problematic dissonance between legal infrastructure and
market practices. Once certain financial products or practices become too big to
fail, 7 they may defy proper regulatory treatment despite excessive risks. 58 This
Article offers one example of private-law rules that transactions executed using
blockchain-based smart contracts could thwart, with wide-ranging consequences:
the rules expressed in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 9 governing
secured transactions.
"Agreements that market actors do not currently associate with UCC Article
9, when expressed as smart contracts, behave like secured transactions." 59 For
example, if a liquidated damages clause in a services contract becomes selfexecuting, then the contract partitions assets to satisfy obligations. "Code-based,
self-executing mechanisms arguably bring any agreement that utilizes them
within the UCC's statutory parameters for security interests." 60 At the same time,
blockchain-based smart contracts can create a "functional convergence of
security interests and entities." 61 "If blockchain-based smart contracts partition
assets in ways that are difficult to classify, market actors may proceed on the
grounds that transactions on a blockchain avoid secured transactions law all
together. "62
Secured transactions law expresses numerous policy choices relevant to the
curtailment of systemic risk. Consider, for example, UCC Article 9's various rules
regarding notice and requiring the reasonable disposition of assets upon default.
If entire markets can use fintech to side-step the UCC's notice requirements and
commercial reasonableness standards for disposition of assets, then fintech can
undermine longstanding policy choices of political significance. How would such
a development impact systemic risk?
A joint study group of the American Law Institute (ALI) and Uniform Law
Commission (ULC) has been meeting to evaluate the UCC and emerging
56. Id.
57. See Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its Discontents:The Dynamics of FinancialProduct
Development, 29 CARDOzO L. REV. 1553,1633 (2008) (explaining how courts and lawmakers decline to
enforce legal doctrines that threaten dominant market practices when doing so would cause upheaval.)
58. See id.; Allen, supra note 3 (arguing that regulators should be involved with algorithmic
automation now, while they can still have influence).
59. Blockchain and the Futureof Secured TransactionsLaw, supra note 3.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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technologies. This ALI and ULC effort proceeds with the posture of assessing
whether the UCC is sufficiently technology neutral. The statute is sufficiently
technology neutral if current rules can accommodate and do not conflict with
emerging technology-enabled transactions and practices. The group engages
normative questions about the desirability of intermediation, or about the
meaning and purpose of perfection of a security interest, for example. But the
group, given time constraints and the number of issues to address, does not
necessarily engage the type of normative, values-driven assessment of law and
fintech that legal scholars are calling for. Ensuring that the UCC does not impede
or fail to accommodate emerging technologies is an important step. Waiting for
market practices to evolve before taking on more difficult and conceptual
questions, however, runs the risk that market practices will depart from legal
norms in an irretrievable way. 63
A decade ago, in the wake of the last financial crisis, scholars observed that
levels of complexity that can exacerbate moral hazard and financial instability
indicate a disregard for foundational property-law principles. 64 If financial
transactions are creatures of contract alone, then nothing prevents contracting to
oblivion: creating more and more complex and compounded claims. Contracts
may be infinitely complex and obtuse, as they are enforceable only by and against
parties in privity of contract with one another. Property rights, in contrast, are
enforceable against third parties. As such, numerus clausus is a feature of
property law systems around the world. 65 This concept-"the number is
closed"-refers to how property law will only enforce interests in property that
take an established, recognizable form. 66 Market actors cannot make up new
forms of property by contract. If they could, they would contract around
bankruptcy rules, foreclosure protections, and tax obligations. The scope of a
property interest is determined by law, based on the intent of the parties as
evidenced by the economic substance of the deal. 67
It is an example of numerus clausus when a court characterizes a conveyance
as an assignment of a security interest rather than an outright sale. For another
example, consider the various, established forms of business entities recognized
by statute in each state. Scholars have argued for regulation to standardize
financial products, such as, for example, permitting issuance of new products with
a "conform or explain" approach. 68 This would help preserve the capacity of
secondary markets to assess and value-and therefore trade-claims more
readily when markets are volatile.

63. See id.; Allen, supra note 3, at 195 (arguing that waiting for proof of risks before addressing them
through policy can be very costly).
64. See FinancialProduct Complexity, Moral Hazard, and the PrivateLaw, supra note 12, at 4.
65. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 13.
66. Id. at 4.
67. Property and the True-Sale Doctrine,supra note 54, at 148.
68. See Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961,
2030 (2010) (describing the benefits of the "conform or explain" approach).
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Now, consider the implications for market complexity of a transacting
smart contracts-that expresses contractual
platform -blockchain-enabled
obligations enforceable against third parties. This type of fintech platform
presents a challenge. If the functions of contract and property law converge, how
do we sustain the dynamic between freedom of contract and the formalities of
property law that is integral to the legal administration of markets? Tasking
various federal regulatory bodies with policing outcomes in blockchain-based
financial markets, to preserve financial stability, may be crucial. But it is also
crucial to watch and digest how private-law concepts operate on emerging
platforms and to tend to the state statues and common law doctrines on which
market expectations rely.

V
CONCLUSION
To the extent lawmakers wish to preserve existing policy choices, and to forge
a functional public and private dynamic surrounding financial markets, they must
be willing to engage with fintech as a phenomenon that presents normative
questions. To the extent we wish to foster financial inclusion and sustainability,
we must think critically about how to harness the best of fintech for the provision
of banking services and access to credit, while protecting against its challenges to
financial systems.

FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND BANKING
REGULATION:
THE ROLE OF PROPORTIONALITY
KERN ALEXANDER*

I
INTRODUCTION

Financial inclusion involves the integration of economic agents into the
financial system by providing them with useful and affordable financial products
and services delivered in a responsible and sustainable way.' Although access to
financial services has increased in the last decade in both developed and
developing countries, approximately one-third of the world's adult population
does not have a transaction account through a regulated financial institution or
mobile money provider.2 In many emerging and developing countries, the share
of those without financial accounts has increased to nearly ninety percent. 3 Yet,
seventy percent of people in these countries-approximately one billion
people-have access to a mobile phone, which technically enables them to access
financial products and services. 4 Although financial inclusion is often closely
associated with increased access to financial products and services, they are not
the same. Some individuals may have access to financial services, but may not
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1. Financial Inclusion, WORLD BANK, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialinclusion/
overview [https://perma.cc/MNQ4-2EKS]. For more discussion on what financial inclusion involves, see
also, Steven L. Schwarcz & Theodore L. Leonhardt, Scoping and Defining FinancialInclusion, Access to
Credit, and SustainableFinance, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2021, at 1, 5-7.
2. ASLI DEMIRG(Q-KUNT, LEORA KLAPPER, DOROTHE SINGER, SANIYA ANSAR & JAKE HESS,
THE GLOBAL FINDEX DATABASE 2017: MEASURING FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND THE FINTECH

REVOLUTION 35 (2018). See generally, Kern Alexander & Xenia Karametaxas, Digital Transformation
and Financial Inclusion, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK ON FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY AND LAW, 273,

279-284 (I. Chu & G. Deipenbrock eds., 2021) (discussing the advantages and legal risks of digital
transformation in financial services inclusion in India and China and the implications for other
developing countries).
3. Aaron Mehrotra & James Yetman, FinancialInclusion -Issues for CentralBanks, BIS Q. REV.,
Mar. 2015, at 83. See also Jon Frost, The Economic Forces Driving FintechAdoption Across Countries 3
(BIS Working Papers No. 838, 2020. Right panel of Figure 1).
4. WORLD BANK GRP., WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2016: DIGITAL DIVIDENDS 6 (2016).
But see PEW RSCH. CTR., MOBILE DIVIDES IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 3 (2019) (showing that in eleven

emerging economies, a median of 6% of adults do not use phones at all, and a median of 7% do not own
phones but instead borrow them from others, together corresponding to 87% having a mobile phone).
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utilize such services, due to prohibitively high prices, regulatory barriers, or a
combination of market, institutional and cultural obstacles.' Access to financial
services varies widely between developing and developed economies; in the latter
most economic participants are included in the formal financial system, whereas
in most developing countries only a small percentage are. Most of those who are
financially excluded are in deprived societal groups6 : for instance, women are
more likely to be financially excluded, as are people with less education and those
living in rural areas, due to the lack of infrastructure and poor economic
conditions. 7

The G20's Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI) has led
international efforts to promote financial inclusion. The GPFI's 2011 white paper
set forth observations and recommendations for how the International StandardSetting Bodies (ISSBs) should integrate financial inclusion into their standard
setting by addressing the issue of who "get[s] access to what range and quality of
formal financial services and at what cost." 8 The Financial Stability Board plays a
coordination role for the ISSBs in pursuit of financial inclusion and other
regulatory objectives, particularly in relation to financial stability. 9 As a result,
the ISSBs, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, have
incorporated financial inclusion into their regulatory standards and supervisory
principles. 0 Moreover, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank assess
member country progress in meeting financial inclusion targets." However, most
countries have applied their regulatory standards and supervisory principles in
respect to financial inclusion in widely disparate ways with little or no framework
for determining whether they are appropriate to meet regulatory objectives.
Separately, financial technology (fintech) innovations have emerged as one
of the fastest growing economic sectors worldwide. 2 Fintech includes digital
5. WORLD BANK GRP.,
INCLUSION 2 (2014).

GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT

REPORT 2014: FINANCIAL

6. EUGENIA MACCHIAVELLO, MICROFINANCE AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION: THE CHALLENGE
OF REGULATING ALTERNATIVE RORMS OF FINANCE 9 (2017).

7.

Id.

8. See generally GLOB. P'SHIP FOR FIN. INCLUSION, GLOBAL STANDARD-SETTING BODIES AND
FINANCIAL INCLUSION FOR THE POOR: TOWARD PROPORTIONATE STANDARDS AND GUIDANCE 1, 7

(2011),
https://www.gpfi.org/sites/gpfi/files/documents/White-Paper-Global-Standard-Setting-BodiesOct-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SK3-9URK].
9. Id. at 7, n.2.
10. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, RANGE OF PRACTICE IN THE REGULATION AND
SUPERVISION OF INSTITUTIONS RELEVANT TO FINANCIAL INCLUSION 3 (2015), https://www.bis.

org/bcbs/publ/d310.pdf [https://perma.cc/QC4Z-444K]

[hereinafter BASEL COMMITTEE RANGE OF

PRACTICE]; BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, MICROFINANCE ACTIVITIES AND THE CORE
PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION 1, 4-5, 9 (2010), https://www.bis.org/publ/

bcbs175.pdf [https://perma.cc/LKN3-VBNQ] [hereinafter BASEL COMMITTEE MICROFINANCE].
11. See WORLD BANK GRP., FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAMS (FSAPS): COVERAGE
OF FINANCIAL INCLUSION IN FSAPS - EVOLUTION DURING 2000-2013 app. C (2014); See also INT'L
MONETARY FUND, REPORTS ON THE OBSERVANCE OF STANDARDS AND CODES (ROSCS) https://

openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/26233 [https://perma.cc/3LSY-M2UZ].
12. GlobalFintech Market Value is Expected to Reach $309.98 Billion at a CAGR of24.8% Through
2022, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/global-
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payments, which are transforming how customers pay for products and services
and carry out other financial transactions.1 3 More specifically, fintech
applications, including block chain, mobile payment systems, platform-based
lending, and capital-raising, are radically transforming the financial services
sector by challenging the business models of established financial institutions and
the operational system by which payments and transactions are conducted. This
digital transformation of the financial sector provides individuals and firms with
lower prices for services, enhanced terms for obtaining credit and other financial
products, and expanded access to the financial system. 4

The GPFI addressed fintech in a follow-up white paper in 2016,'5 which
reviewed, among other things, the ISSBs' work in incorporating financial
inclusion into international standard-setting by addressing new regulatory
challenges including the "digitization of financial services" and its importance in
"reaching financially-excluded and under-served customers."1 6 Digital financial
inclusion has become an important objective for international policymakers, the
ISSBs, and most central banks and national regulatory authorities." In 2020,
however, the COVID-19 pandemic and related lockdowns across the world
imposed severe economic burdens on digital payment and other fintech providers
because of reduced transaction volumes, resulting in many fintech firms accessing
government support schemes to reduce their losses during lockdown. 8
International bodies and most national authorities recognize the importance of
digital payments and other fintech innovations in limiting the spread of COVID19.19 Most countries-particularly developing and emerging market countrieshave adopted support measures, including regulatory relief, for financial
institutions and the fintech industry to facilitate increased use of digital payments
during the lockdowns and to promote other fintech innovations.

fintech-market-value-is-expected-to-reach-309-98-billion-at-a-cagr-of-24-8-through-2022-300926069
.html [https://perma.cc/D9VP-H49Z].
13. Id.
14. Mark Carney, Chair, Fin. Stability Bd., The Promise of FinTech - Something New Under the
Sun?, Address at the Deutsche Bundesbank G20 Conference on "Digitising finance, financial inclusion
and financial literacy", Wiesbaden (Jan. 25, 2017), in BANK OF ENGLAND 2, 6-7, 11, https://
www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2017/the-promise-of-fintech-something-new-under-the-sun
[https://
perma.cc/GZ95-G3SA].
15.

GLOB. P'SHIP FOR FIN. INCLUSION, GLOBAL STANDARD-SETTING BODIES AND FINANCIAL

INCLUSION: THE EVOLVING LANDSCAPE (2016), https://www.gpfi.org/sites/gpfi/files/documents/GPFI
_WhitePaperMar2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/64ZP-8B7V] [hereinafter the GPFI, White Paper].
16. Id. at xi.
17. In fact, approximately one-half of the central banks surveyed had explicit financial inclusion
mandates. See IRVING FISHER COMM. ON CENT. BANK STATS., IFC REPORT: MEASURES OF FINANCIAL
INCLUSION - A CENTRAL BANK PERSPECTIVE 9-10 (2016) (descrbing the research findings concerning

central banks' use of financial inclusion mandates).
18. Gringoli Vincenzo, Glen Williams, John Ott & Thomas Olson, The Covid-19 Tipping Point for
Digital Payments, BAIN INSIGHTS (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.bain.com/insights/the-covid-19-tippingpoint-for-digital-payments [https://perma.cc/QQ2U-5GMP].
19. Id.

132

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 84:129

This Article analyzes the regulatory implications for the banking and
financial services sector, the risks of the emerging digital financial inclusion
policies, and how the principle of proportionality can be interpreted and applied
to regulatory standards and supervisory practices to address these risks. Part II
discusses the definitions and rationale of financial inclusion and how
international standard setting bodies and national authorities-including central
banks and regulators-recognize the growing importance of digital financial
services and other fintech innovations to enhance financial inclusion. Part III
analyzes to what extent fintech is contributing to financial inclusion and
highlights some of the main advantages and regulatory risks of the digital
transformation of financial services. Part IV analyzes some regulatory
approaches that support financial inclusion, including the growing use of
innovation offices and regulatory sandboxes, and how the principle of
proportionality can be applied to balance the risks associated with fintech
innovations to promote financial inclusion, while not undermining other
regulatory objectives. Part V concludes. The analysis is particularly relevant in
the context of the global economic slowdown caused by the COVID-19 pandemic
and accompanying national lockdowns, as well as the response of many
policymakers and regulators to support digital financial inclusion during this
period.

II
FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY

A. Definitions and Rationale
Although financial inclusion is broadly defined as access to financial
services, 20 there is no standard universally accepted definition, as official sector
definitions by central banks and regulators are not harmonized across countries.
According to a Bank for International Settlements survey, most central banks
and regulators reported that the most important elements of the definition were
"access and effective use" of financial services. 2' Most respondents framed access
to financial services in terms of the ability to use financial products and proximity
to various access points. 22 Significantly, most respondents stated that socioeconomic barriers can limit access, and, more broadly, "the pricing and other
terms and conditions of financial products and services can also be relevant
factors limiting the scope for access to financial services for segregated groups." 23
All respondents stated that an important dimension of access for the broader
population was how effectively they used financial products and services,
including "deposit accounts, payment services, micro-credit schemes, and

20.

See IRVING FISHER COMM. ON CENT. BANK STATS., supra note 17, at 4 (discussing the general

importance of financial inclusion in central banks' work).
21. Id. at 7.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 8.
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insurance products."2 The measurement of effective use requires collecting both
micro and macro data on financial products, such as the percentage of adults with
at least one regulated deposit or savings account or the number of credit lines
and credit cards issued by regulated institutions, as well as the aggregate value of
credit or deposits relative to a country's gross domestic product.
A lesser number of respondents defined financial inclusion to include the
supply or availability of financial products and services offered to households and
businesses.25 This involves an assessment of the available products, as well as
demand factors such as the cost of the products.2 6 Various administrative
regulations-including capital requirements and due diligence requirementscan increase that cost, especially among those with poor credit or low access to
credit products.27
Financial inclusion is a public policy concern that directly relates to the
objectives and activities of central banks, financial regulators and international
financial standard-setting bodies. 28 Based on a survey of bank regulators
worldwide, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision concluded that the
definition of financial inclusion consists of several concepts; including access to,
and usage of, financial services; the reliable supply of a variety of products and
services; and the quality of products and services in terms of price, affordability,
and suitability for the capacity of the customer to benefit without incurring
disproportionate risk.29
Advocates of financial inclusion, including the World Bank and G20, 30 stress
that the process of integrating more individuals and businesses into the financial
system contributes to income equality, alleviates poverty, influences saving rates
and investment decisions, and improves overall economic welfare. 31 From an
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mehrotra & Yetman, supra note 3, at 4.

29.

BASEL COMMITTEE MICROFINANCE, supra note 10, at 4-5.

30. GPFI, White Paper, supra note 15, at 14-15.
31. Peter J. Morgan & Victor Pontines, FinancialStability and FinancialInclusion 13 (Asian Dev.
Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 488, 2014), https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156343/
adbi-wp488.pdf [https://perma.cc/YX35-W2YL] (showing greater inclusion leads to reduced liquidity
risks and increased stability of deposit bases); Rui Han & Martin Melecky, FinancialInclusion for
FinancialStability: Access to Bank Deposits and the Growth of Deposits in the Global FinancialCrisis 1617 (World Bank Grp., Policy Research Working Paper No. 6577, 2013), http://documents1.wor
ldbank.org/curated/ar/850681468325448388/pdf/WPS6577.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DWS-7GVQ] (showing
a positive influence of financial inclusion on financial stability because low-income savers and borrowers
tend to have financially stable behavior during crises); Shri H. R. Khan, Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank
of India, Financial Inclusion and Financial Stability: Are They Two Sides of the Same Coin?, Address
Before BANCON 2011 (Nov. 4, 2011), in RBI M. BULL., Mar. 2012, at 553, 563 (arguing that increasing
access to deposit accounts for low-income customers can make bank funding more resilient during
market stress). But see Alfred Hannig & Stefan Jansen, FinancialInclusion and Financial Stability:
Current Policy Issues 24-25 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 259, 2010), https://
www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/53699/1/654899762.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NG5-UG2A] (arguing that
increased access to financial services can result in unsustainable credit booms and financial system
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economic perspective, financial inclusion is considered one of the major enablers
of economic development.3 2 The access to useful and safe financial products may
allow previously unbanked individuals to invest in assets, including their own
education and training, potentially reducing income inequality. 33 Conversely,
financial exclusion increases the risk of poverty and, thus, is a key barrier to
development. 34 Moreover, by making saving and investment decisions more
efficient and facilitating the functioning of the economy, financial inclusion also
reinforces monetary and financial stability. 35
The indirect macroeconomic rationale for financial inclusion is that
expanding access to finance benefits society as a whole because it leads to
economic growth and, thus, to a more stable monetary and financial system. 36
According to economists Aaron Mehrota and James Yetman, enhanced inclusion
should lead to a more efficient allocation of capital and should support central
bank efforts to maintain price stability. 37 Further, increased access to credit and
investment services boosts firm performance and enhances economic well-being.
B.

International Initiatives for Financial Inclusion

ISSBs, the G20, and policy makers have actively addressed the challenges
related to financial inclusion.3 8 In 2006, the UN declared that "access to a wellfunctioning financial system can economically and socially empower individuals,
in particular poor people, allowing them to better integrate into the economy of
their countries, actively contribute to their development and protect themselves
against economic shocks." 39 GPFI, along with its partners, including the Alliance

fragilities). See also Mandira Sarma & Jesim Pais, FinancialInclusion and Development, 23 J. INT. DEV.
613, 626 (2011) (showing that certain financial inclusion policy initiatives likely to have a more "positive
and signifigant" effect than others).
32. Ash Demirgtq-Kunt & Leora Klapper, Measuring Financial Inclusion: The Global Findex
Database 38-40 (World Bank Grp., Policy Research Working Paper No. 6025, 2012), https://open
knowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/6042/WPS6025.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F3XK-TFMQ];
Minjin Kim, Hannah Zoo, Jeejin Lee & Juhee Kang, Mobile FinancialServices, FinancialInclusion, and
Development: A Systematic Review of Academic Literature,E. J. INFO. SYS. DEV. COUNTRIES, Sept. 2018,
at 1, 1; Oksana Kabakova & Evgeny Plaksenkov, Analysis of Factors Affecting Financial Inclusion:
Ecosystem View, 89 J. Bus. RES. 198, 198 (2018).
33. Mehrotra & Yetman, supra note 3, at 83.
34. Kim et al., supra note 32, at 2. See generally Kabakova & Plaksenkov, supra note 32 (surveying
factors enabling financial inclusion in developing countries).
35.

IRVING FISHER COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL BANK STATISTICS, supra note 17, at 4.

36. Philip Mader, Contesting Financial Inclusion, 49 DEV. CHANGE 2, 461-483, 469 (2018)
(supporting the proposition and caveating its general applicability by acknowledgeing that evidence of
this trend is inconclusive).
37. Mehrotra & Yetman, supra note 3, at 83.
38. See, e.g., Kabakova & Plaksenkov, supra note 32, at 198 ("explor[ing] factors that affect the
development of financial inclusion"); M. Mostak Ahamed & Sushanta K. Mallick, Is financial inclusion
good for bank stability? Internationalevidence, 157 J. ECON. BEHAV. ORGAN. 403-427 (2019).
39. U.N. DEPT. OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS AND U.N. CAPITAL DEV. FUND, BUILDING INCLUSIVE
FINANCIAL SECTORS FOR DEVELOPMENT 4 (2006), https://www.uncdfiorg/article/597/building-inclu
sive-financial-sectors-for-development-migration [https://perma.cc/2FLX-36JE].
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for Financial Inclusion (AFI),4 the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, and
the International Finance Corporation, have led international efforts to promote
financial inclusion. Launched in 2010 at the G20 Summit in Seoul, the GPFI
endorsed a Financial Inclusion Action Plan and spurred initial policy actions by
publishing the G20 Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion as a platform for
knowledge sharing, policy advocacy and coordination.4
In 2011, the AFI adopted the Maya Declaration on Financial Inclusion (Maya
Declaration), an initiative to reach the world's unbanked individualsnumbering 2.5 billion at that time - and to encourage national financial inclusion
commitments by central banks in partnership with private sector actors.42 The
Maya Declaration provides that financial inclusion has a critical role in improving
"national and global financial stability and integrity" and in contributing to
"strong and inclusive growth in developing and emerging market countries." 43
Also, the Better than Cash Alliance, a UN-based partnership of governments
(mainly from developing economies), foundations, companies, and international
organizations, was formed in 2012 with the aim to accelerate the transition from
cash to digital payments in order to reduce poverty and promote inclusive
growth.44
Financial inclusion was also recognized in the UN's 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development (2030 SDG Agenda).45 While not a sustainable
development goal (SDG) in itself, financial inclusion is considered an enabler of
the SDGs, and it is featured as a target in eight of the seventeen SDGs listed in

the 2030 SDG Agenda. 46
The emphasis on financial inclusion in the 2030 SDG Agenda is premised on
the important role that the financial system plays in the shift towards a more
sustainable economy. In this vein, financial inclusion has also caught the attention

40. The AFI is a network of financial inclusion policy members consisting of central banks and other
financial regulatory bodies from more than 80 emerging and developing economies. See Alliance for
Financial Inclusion, A Policy Leadership Alliance, AFI GLOBAL, https://www.afi-global.org/about.us
[https://perma.cc/G9J4-SDFV]. The mission of the AFI is to empower policymakers to increase access
and usage of quality financial services for the underserved, through formulation, implementation, and
global advocacy of sustainable and inclusive policies. Id.
41. See James Pearse, About GPFI, GPFI, https://www.gpfi.org/about-gpfi [https://perma.cc/L5TQ6T8S] (last visited Aug. 18, 2020) (discussing the GPFI's work and mission).
42. See generally ALLIANCE FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION, 2018 Maya DeclarationProgressReport
(2018), https://www.afi-global.org/sites/default/files/publications/2018-09/AFIMayareport_2018_AW
_digital.pdf [https://perma.cc/ADA4-2283].
43. Id. at 3.
44. About, BETTER THAN CASH ALLIANCE (2020), https://www.betterthancash.org/about
[https://perma.cc/NBH8-R7UT] (discussing the BCA members, the mission, and work program).
45. G.A. Res. 70/1, ¶ 27 (Oct. 21, 2015).
46. Id. SDG 1's objective is "[t]o end poverty in all its forms everywhere by 2030" while SDG 2 is
'[t]o end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture. Id.
Leora Klapper, Mayada E;-Zoghbi & Jake Hess, Achieving the SustainableDevelopment Goals: The Role
of FinancialInclusion 2 (U.N. Sec'y Gen.'s Special Advoc. for Inclusive Fin. for Dev., Working Paper,
2016) (discussing the relationship between expanding access to financial services and achieving the
SDGs).
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of international financial institutions and central banks. In 2016, the primary
global standard setter for prudential banking regulation, the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, published its guidance on effective banking supervision. 47
Although the Basel Committee's initial focus was on the microfinance activities
of deposit-taking institutions, 48 it has since broadened to include how supervisors
can assist banks in managing the risks associated with the full range of financial
products and services that those with low-income and other socially marginal
groups can access in order to enhance their economic positions. 49
ISSBs have had an active agenda in promoting financial inclusion in their
standard-setting activities. 50 Until recently, most of the ISSBs and financial
market regulators had little appreciation for the role of regulation in mitigating
the social risks associated with financial exclusion and inequity.5 ' Most central
banks and regulators now observe that financial inclusion is within their
respective mandates. 2
In parallel, post-crisis global regulatory reforms have led the ISSBs to rethink
the relationship between the safety and soundness of banking systems and other
regulatory objectives, such as market integrity, financial consumer protection and
financial inclusion. The Bank for International Settlements-based Committee on
Payment and Market Infrastructure (CPMI) has focused on facilitating financial
inclusion by proposing standards to enhance the operation of payment systems
by increasing the efficiency and security by which inter-bank payments can be
made.5 3 Similarly, the Financial Action Task Force formally recognized the risks
of financial exclusion as contributing to money laundering and terrorist
financing. 54 Also, in 2017, the World Bank Group adopted the Financial Inclusion

47. BASEL COMMITTEE, Guidance on the application of the Core Principlesfor Effective Banking
Supervision to the regulation and supervisionof institutionsrelevant to financial inclusion, 1 (2016), https://
www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d383.htm [https://perma.cc/H6RG-4CGY].
48. See GPFI, White Paper , supra note 15, at 20 (discussing an overview of the Basel Committee's
work on finanical inclusion).
49.

BASEL COMMITTEE MICROFINANCE, supra note 10, at 42-43.

50. GPFI, White Paper, supra note 15, at 16-20, 43.
51. MACCHIAVELLO, supra note 6, at 14.
52. Basel Committee, Range of PracticeFinancialInclusion, supra note 10, at 11-12. See also GPFI,
White Paper, supra note 15, at 9-10.
53. COMM. ON PAYMENT & MKT. INFRASTRUCTURE & WORLD BANK GROUP, PAYMENT
ASPECTS OF FINANCIAL INCLUSION (April, 2016) https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d144.pdf [https://

perma.cc/2RM9-MPDL] (providing guiding principles to help countries advance financial inclusion
including key actions to provide basic accounts at little or no cost, stepping up efforts to increase financial
literacy, and adapting electronic payment services to support large-volume payment programmes, such
as government payments).
54. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF GUIDANCE: ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND
TERRORIST FINANCING MEASURES AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION 12-27 (2013), https://www.fatf-

gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/AMLCFTMeasures_andFinancialInclusion_2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3JNT-HTJ3] (defining financial inclusion and guidance on support for financial
inclusion).

No. 1 2021]

FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND BANKING REGULATION

137

Global Initiative to support and accelerate the implementation of country-led
reform actions to meet national financial inclusion targets."
C.

Financial Inclusion - The Dark Side

Notwithstanding the economic benefits of financial inclusion, increased
access to financial services can contribute to excessive financialization in the
economy, resulting from widespread mis-selling of financial products and
investments, and unduly stringent repayment terms saddling vulnerable groups
with onerous debts and undermining the security of long-term savings and
pensions. The current level of private debt in many developed and developing
countries can be described as a ticking time bomb that contributes to growing
inequality. For instance, many countries have ballooning household debt,
sometimes higher than was observed before the 2008 financial crisis. 56 In the
United Kingdom, Bank of England data shows that since 2010, lending to
individuals and small businesses has increased significantly, particularly in
personal loans, overdrafts, and credit card debt.5
The literature in law, behavioral economics, and sociology has generally
criticized the current policy paradigm as based, more or less implicitly, on a set
of concepts-such as: increased access to finance is always beneficial, consumers
are rational, or the market produces efficient outcomes-which require
fundamental rethinking.58 Increased financial inclusion raises fundamental
questions about the effectiveness of existing financial regulation, the adequacy of
current debt management policies, and the adequacy of social and economic
support for vulnerable groups who have undue exposure to risky financial
products.

III
DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION

Fintech links together the delivery of financial services with digital
technology. The financial services industry has always relied on technological

55. Financial Inclusion Global Initiative (FIGI), WORLD BANK GRP. (July 18, 2019), https://
www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialinclusion/brief/figi [https://perma.cc/6PEM-29GC].
56.

See, e.g., DANIEL HARARI, HOUSE OF COMMONS, HOUSEHOLD DEBT: STATISTICS AND

IMPACT ON ECONOMY, 2018, CPB-7584, at 9-10 (showing that, after a period of declining household
debt following the recession, UK household debt began rising sharply again beginning in 2014); See also,
Nicholas Gane, Debt, Usury and the Ongoing Crises of Capitalism, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEBT 175
(Mark Featherstone ed., 2019) ("Just over ten years since the start of the global financial crisis, many
advanced capitalist societies are witnessing the rise of private debt to the levels previously seen in
2008....").
57. Money and Credit - June 2019, BANK OF ENGLAND (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.bankof
england.co.uk/statistics/money-and-credit/2020/september-2020 [https://perma.cc/AC73-U398].
58. See generally IAIN RAMSAY, PERSONAL INSOLVENCY LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2017);
Anne-Francoise Lefevre & Michael Chapman, Behaviour Economics Consumer FinancialProtection
(OECD Working Papers on Fin., Insurance & Private Pension, Paper No. 42, 2017), https://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/0c8685b2-en.pdf?expires=1606229792&id=id&accname-guest&checksum=E67
13B7B59753C763A385C1A73542E4D [https://perma.cc/62BL-US7G].
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advances to drive innovation in the provision of services and the allocation of
capital, but recent innovations-such as blockchain, mobile payment systems,
peer-to-peer lending and crowd-funding platforms, and other internet-based
services-have challenged the traditional business models for delivering banking
and financial services. Indeed, fintech has given rise to new forms of currencies
and new ways of allocating capital, managing risks, and carrying out financial
transactions. This digital transformation of the financial sector provides
consumers with better targeted-services and lower prices, facilitates access to
credit for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), enhances productivity of
traditional financial institutions, and, more fundamentally, enhances the
potential for individuals and firms to access the financial system. 59
A. Fintech and Financial Inclusion
Fintech innovations contain the potential to increase proximity with
customers by bypassing financial intermediaries. The boundaries between
financial providers and their customers has become increasingly blurred, which
challenges current regulatory approaches. 60 For instance, crowdfunding
companies have disrupted the business of raising capital and challenged the
market power of large banks in deciding which companies and individuals receive
loans and investment. Another example is software and mobile phone
applications that match borrowers with lenders without a traditional
intermediary. These so-called peer-to-peer lending platforms have been highly
successful in China where they expanded exponentially in just a decade, from a
single platform in 2007 to almost two thousand in 2017.61 These platforms can
pool capital from multiple sources and allocate it to a wide range of customers
thus diversifying default risk. Consequently, large banks find themselves under
competitive pressure, which improves overall economic efficiency.
The shortened intermediary chain facilitates access to financial products and
services by drastically reducing information asymmetry and transaction costs.
This suggests that digital transformation has the potential not only to create a
highly efficient and integrated economic system, but also to increase access to
financial products and services for those who lack formal transaction accounts,
thereby increasing access to the financial system.

59. See Carney, supra note 14, at 2, 5-7, 11. See also Dirk A. Zetzsche, Douglas W. Arner, Roos P.
Buckley & Rolf H. Weber, The Future of Data Driven Finance: FinancialRegulation, Data Regulation,
and RegTech, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Apr. 15, 2019), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/04/15/thefuture-of-data-driven-finance-financial-regul ation-data-regulation-and-regtech/ [https://perma.cc/8B69
-MLZW].
60. MACCHIAVELLO, supra note 6, at 213. See also,. Gudula Deipenbrock, Sustainable
Development, the Interest(s) of the Company and the Role of the Boardfrom the Perspectiveof a German
Aktiengesellschaft (Univ. of Oslo Faculty of L. Legal Studies Research Paper Ser. No. 210-02).
61. James Guild, Fintech and the Future of Finance, 10 ASIAN J. PUB. AFF. 52, 59 (2017).
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Considering the above, the link between expanding access to financial
products and services and development seems unquestionable. 62 However, while
fintech innovations create significant potential to widen access to the financial
system, that widened access does not necessarily lead to a more sustainable
financial system, as it creates or exacerbates financial risks, as well as social risks,
to which traditionally excluded groups are exposed. First, fintech innovations
raise concerns about consumer protection and over-indebtedness. While the
digital transformation of the financial sector spurs financial inclusion of lowincome households and businesses by boosting their incomes and savings, it also
leads to individuals and SMEs incurring more debt.
Second, fintech innovations create more opportunities for misuse of financial
data. Most individuals underestimate the privacy risks that cheap financial
products entail. Indeed, fintech providers use algorithms to make decisions about
their customers, which may reinforce existing disparities and financial
exclusion. 63 Whereas traditional financial institutions are bound by a detailed
regulatory framework to protect the use of their customer's data, fintech
companies often do not fit into existing legal categories which allows them to
avoid compliance with burdensome regulation.
In considering the linkages between regulating both finance and data, the
EU's implementation of the General Protection of Data Regulation has resulted
in a fundamental change in how firms are required to manage personal data; it
applies to all EU markets and citizens, as well as all non-EU persons and firms
dealing with EU markets and firms. 64 The EU places great emphasis on a privacyoriented approach to data protection that provides uniquely stronger safeguards
for customer data protection and portability than almost any other large
economic jurisdiction. In contrast, the United States has taken a different, and
far less stringent, approach to data regulation and privacy in the financial sector
that has allowed the emergence of a small group of Big Tech and fintech
companies who dominate the market share. 65 Indeed, although the digitalization
of financial services has led to increased access to financial services for underprivileged groups, along with reductions in corruption and tax evasion in some
countries, 66 there are serious regulatory challenges regarding financial stability,
62. See Kapper et al., supra note 46, at 9 ("People with access to finaincial services are better
positioned to suceed economically abd build a decent life, ultimatley making it easer to reduce
inequality .... ").
63. Pearse, supra note 41.
64. See generally Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regards to the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.
65. See Dirk A. Zetzsche, Douglas W. Arner, Roos P. Buckley & Rolf H. Weber, The Future of
Data Driven Finance and RegTech: Lessons from EU Big Bang II, at 37 (Eur. Banking Inst. Working
Paper No. 35, 2019).
66 India has adopted the India Stack strategy that combines a system of digital identification
supporting a digital payment system that facilitates interoperability across traditional and new payment
technologies and providers. An important part of India Stack is the Aadhaar system that is operated by
the Unique Identification Authority of India. The Aadhaar system provides a unique 12-digit randomised

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

140

[Vol. 84:129

depositor protection, consumer financial protection, and the control of money
laundering and terrorist finance.
B.

International Initiatives in Digital Financial Inclusion
The G20 reaffirmed its initial 2010 Principles for Innovative Financial

Inclusion in 2016 by endorsing the G20 High-Level Principles for Digital
Financial Inclusion, which focused on providing a basis for national action plans
to leverage the potential offered by digital technologies to enhance access to
financial services. 67 The G20 High Level Principles have driven other ISSBs to
incorporate digital financial regulation into regulatory standards and supervisory
practices. These international initiatives are premised on the key assumption that
the expansion of digital financial markets and enhanced technology in the
provision of financial services is vital for economic development, particularly in
developing and emerging market countries. Moreover, the growing role of Big
Tech firms such as Google, Amazon, and Facebook, along with the existing
influence of incumbent financial institutions in providing financial services, are
leading a transformation of the traditional banking and financial system to a datadriven business model, resulting in a Big Bang in the provision of financial
services. 68 This has highlighted one of the greatest challenges for the global
financial services industry regarding how to reconcile the objectives and the tools
of data regulation and financial regulation. The proponents of this "Big Bang" in
data-driven financial services and its broad scope of application argue that it will
enhance financial inclusion by widening access to financial services, resulting in
improved living standards and poverty alleviation because of reduced transaction
costs in the provision of capital and credit to a larger number of individuals and
firms. 69

identification number to all residents on a voluntary basis. Since 2016, almost all of India's 1.3 billion
people have been registered with numbers that make it more administratively efficient for the
government to provide access to government services, including social insurance and welfare payments,
and banking, insurance and other services. See Kathryn Henne, Surveillance in the name of governance:
Aadhar as a Fix for Leaking Systems in India, in, INFORMATION, TECHNOLOGY AND CONTROL IN A
CHANGING WORLD - UNDERSTANDING POWER STRUCTURES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 223,224 (Blayne
Haggart, Kathryn Henne & Natasha Tusikov eds., Palgrave Macmillan 2019).
67.

G20,

G20

HIGH-LEVEL

PRINCIPLES

FOR

DIGITAL

FINANCIAL

INCLUSION

(2016),

https://www.gpfi.org/sites/gpfi/files/documents/G20 High Level Principles for Digital Financial Inclusion
- Full version-.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WW7-QT2J].
68. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has addressed some of the important questions
about how to regulate finance, data, and technology in ways that do not inhibit the development of the
digital economy. The FTC adopted in 2019 broad new requirements for financial institutions to protect
the privacy and security of customers' data. See Federal Trade Commission, FTC Seeks Comment on
Proposed Amendments to Safeguards and Privacy Rules (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2019/03/ftc-seeks-comment-proposed-amendments-safeguards-privacy-rules
[https://perma.cc/748X-5U2R].
69. See, e.g., Tavneet Suri & William Jack, The long-run poverty and gender impacts of mobile
money, 354 SCIENCE 1288, 1288 (2016) (explaining how mobile money has "increased the efficiency of
the allocation of consumption over time while allowing a more efficient allocation of labor, resulting in
a meaningful reduction of poverty in Kenya").
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Nonetheless, policymakers and regulators should not be unduly optimistic
about the use of digitalization to promote financial inclusion as a strategy for
poverty alleviation and development. The hypothesis that digitally-driven
financial inclusion leads to improved living standards has attracted controversy
and criticism regarding the social risks involved. 70 Critics point out that financial
inclusion is a mere re-branding for microfinance, which appeared in the 1970s
and, following initial praise, 7' developed into a "global finance-development
hybrid specialized in making high-interest loans".7 2 Microfinance institutions
have come under scrutiny for a variety of reasons, notably their high-interest
rates and their fixation on credit, which often leads to over-indebtedness. 73
Although microfinance and financial inclusion are related concepts, 74 there
are important differences. With community-based programs, cooperative
institutions, technology firms, mobile network operators, and credit card
companies on board, financial inclusion involves a new set of players and
practices that have little in common with microfinance. 75 In addition, with the
impetus of sustainable development, financial inclusion blends the concepts of
capital formation and financial governance with the idea of social justice and
equality. 76 Financial inclusion expands the focus of finance beyond the mere
allocation of savings from investors to viable economic projects but also provides
access to finance by those individuals and businesses who have traditionally faced
barriers to the formal financial system. Indeed, an important objective of
financial policy not only is to provide a sustainable flow of finance on efficient
terms to viable economic agents but also to expand access to socially marginal
groups in order to create more opportunities for wealth creation and to mitigate
social risks, including economic inequality. Although fintech innovations can play

70. For a critical view on financial inclusion, see Mader, supra note 36, at 46. See generally Milford
Bateman, Mare Duvendack & Nicholas Loubere, Is fin-tech the new panaceafor poverty alleviation and
local development? Contesting Suri and Jack's M-Pesa findingspublished in Science, 46 REV. AFR. POLIT.
ECON. 480 (2019).
71. The U.N. and the World Bank regarded microfinance as a "miraculous tool to spur
development." MACCHIAVELLO, supra note 6, at 82. See also International Conference on Financing for
Development, Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financingfor Development, 8,
118, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.198/11 (Mar. 18-22, 2003), https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/
population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/ACONF.198_11.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/
R9LH-TGDU] ("Microfinance and credit for micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises, including in
rural areas, particularly for women, as well as national savings schemes, are important for enhancing the
social and economic impact of the financial sector."); Ousa Sananikone, Microfinanceand the Millennium
Development Goals (Consultative Grp. to Assist the Poor, Donor Brief No. 9, 2002), https://
www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Donor-Brief-Microfinance-and-the-Millennium-DevelopmentGoals-Dec-2002.pdf [https://perma.cc/SUW9-FDM4] (explaining how microfinance contributes to global
development goals).
72. Mader, supra note 36, at 463.
73. See Id. ("[T]here is some truth to this suggestion of a mere re-branding, because much of today's
financial inclusion activity is still microfinance: high-interest loans extended to low-income people.").
74. For a discussion of the interrelationship between financial inclusion and microfinance, see
MACCHIAVELLO, supra note 6, at 18, 82.
75. Mader, supra note 36, at 463.
76. Id.

142

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 84:129

an important role in expanding access to the financial system, they can have
unintended consequences. The distribution of unsuitable financial products to
individuals can undermine consumer financial protection by leading to
disproportionate losses resulting in high levels of indebtedness, growing poverty,
and other social pathologies."?

C.

COVID-19 and Digital Financial Inclusion

Social risks have come to the forefront with the policy and regulatory
measures taken by many governments to support digital financial inclusion
during the COVID-19 pandemic and economic lockdowns. Although the
pandemic lockdown has led to reduced transaction volumes for most digital
payment providers, 78 it has created an unexpected opportunity to use digital
technologies to enhance access to financial services to financially excluded
groups. In many developing countries where financial inclusion levels are among
the lowest in the world, governments have adopted policy measures in response
to COVID-19 that enhance the role of digital finance to support financial
inclusion. 79 Generally, government measures across the developing world have
focused on maintaining access to payment channels and instruments in order to
reduce the risk of infection due to handling cash.80 While some countries have
designated banks and payment service providers as essential service providers in
order to maintain cash-in and cash-out networks for customers, others have
allowed mobile money providers and other networks of payment agents to
continue operating during lockdown in order to allow them to disburse
government payments and social benefits. 81 Still other countries have reduced or
eliminated mobile payment service providers' fees,82 while other jurisdictions
have relaxed anti-money laundering know-your-customer procedures to increase
remote access to financial accounts through digital payment methods. 83 Some

77. Id.
78. Gringoli et al., supra note 18.
79. See AFI COVID-19 Policy Response & Dashboard,ALL. FOR FIN. INCLUSION, https://www.afiglobal.org/afi-covid-19-policy-response [https://perma.cc/FM4P-Q4V6] (follow the "View the live page
>" hyperlink at the top of the perma.cc record; then select the "Dashboard - AFI members' COVID-19
Policy Response" image to access the dashboard hosted on Dropbox).
80. Raphael Auer, Giulio Cornelli & Jon Frost, Covid-19 Cash and the Future of Payments, BIS
BULL., at 1-6 (April 3, 2020).
81. Nitish Narain, Abhishek Anand, Surbhi Sood & Shobhit Mishra, CICOAgents: the under-valued
"first responders", MICROSAVE CONSULTING (April 15, 2020), https://www.microsave.net/2020/04/
15/cico-agents-the-under-valued-first-responders/
[https://perma.cc/GP2T-SB6E] (discussing India's
designation of all mobile money providers and payment agents as essential service providers).
82. The Central Bank of Kenya announced on March 16, 2020 "measures to facilitate increased use
of mobile money transactions instead of cash, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic," including
eliminating charges for mobile money transactions, resulting in more than 1.6 million additional
customers using mobile money channels. ALL. FOR FIN. INCLUSION, supra note 79.
83. The Bank of Ghana adopted legislation in March 2020 to "facilitate more efficient payments
and promote digital forms of payments" and to increase transaction account limits during the lockdown.
See BANK OF GHANA, MONETARY POLICY PRESS RELEASE (2020), https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-

content/uploads/2020/03/MPC-Press-Release-March-2020-3.pdf

[https://perma.cc/US89-M7U2].
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countries have adopted a risk-based regulatory approach that assigns a risk level
to different types of customers and accounts in order to determine an acceptable
volume and value for transaction limits. 84
These measures aim to use digital financial services to support economies
during the lockdown and to contribute to longer-term economic recovery. Both
developed and developing countries are adopting facilitation strategies like the
above to provide regulators with more flexibility in supporting digital financial
inclusion without undermining regulatory objectives.
Ultimately, the quest for social justice suggests that regulators and
policymakers should ensure that data-driven financial services and related
fintech innovations do not lead to a development hybrid that increases the
asymmetric power of financial institutions at the expense of their customers,
particularly those in socially marginal and vulnerable groups. An inclusive
financial system calls for a digital transformation of finance and not for
incremental measures that merely mitigate the symptoms of poverty by extending
services to the poor as a goal itself. The aim should be to maximize economic
opportunities while minimizing the risks for society.

IV
PROPORTIONALITY

The risks and unintended consequences of digital financial inclusion raise
important policy questions about the appropriate role for regulation and
supervision to support financial inclusion. From a regulatory perspective, the
challenge is to ensure that digital financial inclusion enhances access to financial
services in a way that maximizes economic opportunities and minimizes the risks
for society.85 Directing fintech innovation towards inclusive growth and increased
social equity requires coordination on an international level that brings together
all relevant stakeholders such as fintech companies, standard-setting bodies, and
national financial regulators. As a first step, the UN has recommended the
development of good practices for regulating and monitoring fintech
innovations. 86 But the more significant work in this area should come from the
specialized international financial standard-setting bodies.
84. The Central Bank of Egypt has increased transaction limits for mobile payment providers in
response to Covid-19 by allowing individuals to send up to approximately $2,000 per day and $6370 per
month. See CENT. BANK OF EGYPT, CIRCULAR DATED 20 MARCH 2020 FOLLOWING THE
PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES TO COUNTER THE EFFECTS OF COVID-19 VIRUS (2020); see also CENT.
BANK OF EGYPT, CIRCULAR DATED 29 MARCH 2020 REGARDING SETTING MAXIMUM LIMITS FOR
CASH DEPOSITS & WITHDRAWALS WITHIN THE PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES TO COUNTER THE

EFFECTS OF COVID-19 VIRUS (2020), https://www.cbe.org.eg/en/Pages/HighlightsPages/Circular
%20dated%2029%20March%202020%20regarding%20setting%20maximum%201imits%20for%20cas
h%20deposits%20&%20withdrawals%20within%20the%20precautionary%20measures%20to%20cou
nter%20the%20effects%20of%20COVID-19%20virus.aspx [https://perma.cc/734Z-44ZS].
85. Carney, supra note 14, at 3, 8.
86 See UN SEC'Y GEN.'S SPECIAL ADVOC. FOR INCLUSIVE FIN. FOR DEV., 2019 ANN. REP. TO
Report.pdf
GEN.,
https://www.unsgsa.org/files/8215/6942/4860/UNSGSA_2019_Annual_
SEC'Y
[https://perma.cc/4T5S-DTD9].
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International Regulation and Digital Financial Inclusion

Financial markets are increasingly interconnected, yet financial systems
remain primarily administered on a national level. In order to unleash the full
potential for fintech to contribute to sustainable and inclusive growth, financial
regulators and central banks should consider how the principle of proportionality
should apply to manage the risks that arise from digital financial innovations to
support a more inclusive financial system. William Magnuson identified three
principles for an "internationally minded regulatory regime" to fintech
regulation.87
First, the network of fintech suppliers, consumers, and investors are dispersed
across national borders, resulting in multiple regulators having an interest in
regulating the cross-border activities of fintech providers. The regulation of
fintech activities therefore requires a significant extraterritorial dimension. 88
Second, the regulatory approach of one country necessarily affects other
countries, for there are important distributional effects of choosing one
regulatory regime over another. 89 This means that jurisdictions are in competition
with each other, which may lead to a race to the bottom, given that a specifically
burdensome regulatory approach may cause fintech activity to shift from one
country to another.
Third, despite regulatory competition between jurisdictions, financial
regulators should establish ties with their counterparts in other jurisdictions, in
order to share useful information with respect to their experience with fintech
regulation. By building networks for formal and informal exchanges of
information, financial regulators could benefit from the experiences of other
financial authorities. 90
The Basel Committee began to address the risks associated with increased
financial inclusion in the context of microfinance and the risks it poses to banks
and other deposit-taking institutions in a survey it conducted of member and nonmember countries in 2009.91 The results of the survey led to the Basel Committee
adopting a set of guidelines in 2010 for how banks should manage the risks
associated with microfinance, which were the first set of international guidelines
for how bank supervisors should integrate inclusion into their regulatory
frameworks. 92
Later, following the GPFI's 2011 white paper that emphasized the importance
of "proportionate standards and guidance" to achieve "financial inclusion for the
poor,"93 the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board undertook a

87.
88.
89.
90.

William Magnuson, RegulatingFintech, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1222 (2018).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1225.

91.

See BASEL COMMITTEE RANGE OF PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 3.

92. See BASEL COMMITTEE MICROFINANCE, supra note 10, at 5, 12 (applying BCP to microfinance
activities).
93. Glob. P'ship for Fin. Inclusion, supra note 8.
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review of their member countries' regulatory practices to assess the extent to
which they incorporate financial inclusion. To this end, the Basel Committee
established a Workstream on Financial Inclusion in 2013 to gain a better
understanding of the context and institutional constraints facing member and
non-member countries in promoting financial inclusion. The Workstream
conducted a survey of regulatory and supervisory practices for banks and deposittaking institutions in developed and developing countries resulting in a report in
a 2015.94 Based on this survey, the Basel Committee revised the Core Principles
for Banking Supervision in 2016 to recommend some regulatory approaches for
supervising the risks associated with digital financial inclusion.9 5
The Basel Committee's efforts raise the important issue of how regulatory
frameworks can facilitate the process of expanding access to finance for underserved and socially excluded groups, particularly in low-income countries.
Central banks, financial regulators, and international financial organizations
control many of the levers that can integrate financial inclusion into regulatory
frameworks while the principle of proportionality in financial supervision allows
a degree of flexibility to respect local institutional structures and social market
practices.
B.

Proportionality as a Legal Concept

When it comes to considering possible policy pathways to promote digital
financial inclusion, the principle of proportionality is vital for understanding how
regulators can balance important rights and interests in the pursuit of this policy
aim. How can we shape regulation in a way that does not unduly restrict
inclusion? What is the optimal level of regulation for the market? On the one
hand, regulatory safeguards are necessary to mitigate the risks that arise with
fintech innovation. On the other hand, given that regulation raises prices for
products and services, regulatory intervention should not infringe fundamental
rights, such as the freedom to conduct business, which includes the right to
dispose of one's property and to keep sensitive information confidential. 96
Similarly, the freedom to conduct a business derives from the right to
property recognized under international law and the European Convention on
Human Rights. Despite the recognized right to property under international and
human rights law, states may regulate such ownership rights for a valid public
purpose so long as the imposition on property rights is proportionate to achieve

94.

See BASEL COMMITTEE RANGE OF PRACTICE ,5-8, supra note 10, at 5-8.

95. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, GUIDANCE ON THE CORE PRINCIPLES FOR
EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION TO THE REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF INSTITUTIONS
RELEVANT TO FINANCIAL INCLUSION 3, 4 (2016), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d383.pdf [https://

perma.cc/74YZ-UY7V].
96. Chiara Zilioli, Proportionalityas the OrganizingPrinciple of EuropeanBanking Regulation, in
ZENTRALBANKEN, WAHRUNGSUNION UND STABILES FINANZSYSTEM - FESTSCHRIFT FUR HELMUT
SIEKMANN [CENTRAL BANKS, MONETARY UNION, AND A STABLE FINANCIAL SYSTEM] 257 (Theodor

Baums et al. eds., 2019).

146

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 84:129

a legitimate state aim. 97 In financial regulation, regulators may therefore adopt
regulatory controls that impinge on the freedom to conduct a business so long as
those controls are proportionate measures to achieve valid regulatory objectives,
such as investor and consumer protection, the stability of the financial system,
and market integrity. 98
The EU Treaties and secondary legislation also recognize the principle of
proportionality as a fundamental legal principle that guides the exercise of state
power when it impinges on fundamental treaty rights. 99 Article 5(4) notes that
"under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action
shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties." 00
The Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU) has recognized proportionality
as an unwritten general principle of law and has recognized a three-step test to
determine whether a governmental measure is proportionate or not.11
First, the CJEU considers whether the governmental measure in question is
suitable or appropriate for achieving a specific legitimate aim. 02 According to
CJEU case law, a measure is appropriate or suitable if it genuinely reflects a
concern to attain the objective in a consistent and systematic manner.1 03 The
CJEU has applied this test by limiting its review to whether the relevant measure
is "manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective pursued."10 4
Second, the CJEU considers whether the governmental measure that
infringes a fundamental right-i.e. a property right-is necessary to achieve a
valid state objective, or if there is a less intrusive means to achieve the aim. Under
this necessity test, there should not exist alternative measures which fulfil the

97. JOHN LINARELLI, MARGOT E. SALOMON & MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH, THE
MISERY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONFRONTATIONS WITH INJUSTICE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 96,

161, 166 (2018) (discussing the emergence of proportionality in the law of expropriation and its use in
foreign investment treaties, and how arbitrators apply the proportionality principle).
98. See Council Regulation (EU) 1024/2013, art. 1(1), 2013 O.J. (L 287) 63, 72.
99. See ANA PAULA CASTRO CARVALHO, STEFAN HOHL, ROLAND RASKOPF & SABRINA
RUHNAU, FIN. STABILITY INST., PROPORTIONALITY IN BANKING REGULATION: A CROSS-COUNTRY

COMPARISON 15 (2017), https://www.bis.org/fsi/publ/insightst.pdf [https://perma.cc/GPS2-M4CM].
100. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 5(4), May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115)
18.
101. See Case C-442/02, CaixaBank France v. Ministere de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie
(The CaixaBank Case), 2004 E.C.R. 1-08961 1 17.
102. According to the German Federal Constitutional Court, a measure is suitable or appropriate if
it results in achieving a certain goal. BVerfG, 2 BvR 859/15, May 5, 2020, https://www.bundesverfassun
gsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2020/05/rs20200505_2bvr085915en.html [https://perma.cc/
4JB6-ULD4]. EU member states and countries that are parties to the European Convention on Human
Right recognize the principle of proportionality in their respective legal systems. Id. at 58.
103. See Case C-64/08, Staatsanwaltschaft Linz v. Engelmann, 2010 E.C.R. 1-08219, 8256 1 35; Case
C-137/09, Josemans, 2010 E.C.R. 1-13054, 13077 1 70; Case C-28/09, Comm'n v Austria, 2011 E.C.R. I13567, 13605 1 126.
104. Case C-210/03, Swedish Match v. Secretary of State for Health, 2004 E.C.R. 1-11900, 11919 1 48;
Case C-15/10, Etimine SA v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, 2011 E.C.R. 1-6725, 6762 1 145;
Case C-40/72, Schroeder v Germany, E.C.R. 1973, 1-126, 142 and 143 1 14.

No. 1 2021]

FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND BANKING REGULATION

147

measure's aim but which infringe on constitutional or fundamental rights of the
individual in a less restrictive manner." 5
Third, the CJEU construes proportionality in the strict sense (proportionality
stricto sensu). This requires a comparison of the private and the public interests
at stake and asks the question: Does the public interest outweigh the limitation
on the private rights-that is, the harm to constitutional rights? However, recent
decisions show a tendency to merge the elements of appropriateness and
necessity.1 06
The proportionality principle applies equally in financial regulations.1 07 The
CaixaBank Case provides a classic statement of how the proportionality principle
applies under EU banking law in respect of a regulatory measure that applied
equally to foreign EU-based and host state banks but which posed a significant
barrier against EU-based bank's access to the host state's local market.1 08 In
striking down the host state measure as disproportionate, the CJEU ruled that
the proportionality requirement and necessity test provided that a regulatory
measure "may be justified where it serves overriding requirements relating to the
public interest, is suitable for securing the attainment of the objective it pursues
and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it."1 09
Based on The CaixaBank Case and other CJEU jurisprudence, a court's
application of the proportionality principle in the context of a financial regulatory
measure will involve assessing (1) the appropriateness of the measure to achieve
a legitimate policy objective in a consistent and systematic manner, and (2)
whether the measure is necessary, that is, whether recourse can be had to less
onerous means for attaining the objective pursued. The appropriateness
assessment will depend on whether the imposition on private rights is outweighed
by the public interest at stake. Determining whether a measure is less onerous
will depend on the relative costs and disadvantages imposed on the regulated
party in comparison with the costs and disadvantages created by an alternative
measure that can attain the same objective." 0 It is suggested in the next Sub-part
that the application of this principle characterized by the terms "suitable,"
"appropriate" and "necessary," according to the case-law of the CJEU, should
inform the regulatory practice of states concerning digital financial inclusion if
the measure in question genuinely reflects a concern to attain the objective in a
consistent and systematic manner.

105. Case C-189/01, Jippes v. Minister van Landbouw, E.C.R. 2001, 1-5693, 5720 M81; Case C-343/09,
Afton Chemical v. Secretary of State for Transport, E.C.R. 2010, 1-7062, 7078 1 45; Case C-150/10, BIRB
v. Beneo-Orafti, 2011 E.C.R. I-6881, 6911 11 75; Case C-358/14, Poland v Parliament and Council, 2016,
ECLI: EU:C:2016:323, 9[ 78.
106. Case C-58/08, Vodafone and Others v. Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and
Regulatory Reform, 2010 E.C.R. I-5026, 5045 11[ 53 and 54.
107. The CaxiaBank Case, 2004 E.C.R. 1-08961 1 17.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Case C-261/81, Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke v. De Smedt PVBA, 1982 E.C.R. 1-3962, 3973 1
17.
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The Basel Core Principles and Proportionality

The Basel Committee acknowledged the principle of proportionality as one
of the core principles for effective banking supervision. For instance, Core
Principle 8 entitled "Supervisory approach" provides:
An effective system of banking supervision requires the supervisor to develop and
maintain a forward-looking assessment of the risk profile of individual banks and
banking groups, proportionate to their systemic importance; identify, assess, and
address risks emanating from banks and the banking system as a whole; have a
framework in place for early intervention; and have plans in place, in partnership with
other relevant authorities, to take action to resolve banks in an orderly manner if they
become non-viable."'

Accordingly, the risks from fintech players for the financial systems call for a
well-calibrated regulatory and supervisory approach." 2
Most policymakers and market participants would agree that regulatory
intervention should be proportionate, but proportionality is an elastic concept
with different meanings in different jurisdictions. International standards for
digital financial inclusion should be adjusted for different jurisdictions. Since
developed and developing economies have very different starting points, in terms
of institutional structures and social market practices, with the latter being
characterized by higher inequality and weaker institutional structures, it becomes
apparent that there is no one-size-fits-all solution for regulatory intervention. In
this regard, it is important to ensure that developing countries are able to
experiment with different regulatory tools to address the risks posed by digital
financial inclusion while supporting other regulatory and economic policy values.
Emerging and developing economies, for which financial inclusion is a particular
concern, should apply the principle of proportionality in a way that allows them
to pursue adequately other regulatory objectives without dismantling local
institutional structures and undermining social values. One way to do this would
be to adopt a general approach that incorporates a similar version of the CJEU's
appropriateness assessment and necessity test. This would afford countries the
flexibility to consider a range of measures to achieve digital financial inclusion
objectives without undermining other regulatory or policy objectives and which
pay respect to local institutional structures and social market practices.
For instance, from a systemic risk perspective, decentralized and rapidly
evolving technologies may pose a risk to the stability of the financial system.113
Certainly, the arrival of new depositors generates more diversity on the lending
market which, at first glance, may contribute to financial stability. Yet, the
expansion of financial access also leads to rapid and excessive credit growth with
inadequate lending standards and, potentially, to instability in lending markets."4
The fact that fintech companies are usually small, dispersed, and difficult to

111. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING
SUPERVISION 10-11 (2012).

112.
113.
114.

Mehrotra & Yetman, supra note 3, at 88.
Magnuson, supra note 87, at 1199.
Mehrotra and Yetman, supra note 3, at 84, 92; Magnuson, supra note 91, at 1200.
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monitor raises other systemic risks than the ones that led to the financial crisis of
2008."5 In fact, an under-appreciated systemic risk in the fintech sector has been
that its fast-paced growth creates the risk that the fintech industry skips the
intermediary stage of being "too large to ignore" by evolving directly from "too
small to care" to "too big to fail."116
Similarly, fintech innovations and related digital technologies pose significant
risks to data and anti-fraud protections, demonstrating the inherent weaknesses
of such technologies, particularly in developing countries where data is much
more limited and in certain cases easier to misrepresent and misuse. This is why
fintech innovations should be scrutinized closely for their compliance with data
protection, anti-money laundering, and cyber-security regulations." Compliance
with anti-financial crime regulations is also important from a financial inclusion
perspective since economic agents who are not using formal deposit-taking banks
are even more vulnerable to fraud and misuse of data. Recently, scandals erupted
over fraud and abusive practices by fintech companies, involving the use of
mobile phones to make payments.118
A proportionate regulatory response is also a matter of the right timing, since
regulatory requirements should not unnecessarily suppress financial innovation
at an early stage. Yet, if new service providers become economically important
to the extent that they could pose potential financial stability risks, regulators
should intervene.11 9 An example to illustrate the importance of the right timing
of regulatory intervention is the reaction of the Kenyan Central Bank following
its adoption in 2007 of its digital mobile currency M-Pesa. Initially, M-Pesa
benefited from low start-up requirements, since the technology used the existing
telecom network, meaning that there was no need to invest in or expand
infrastructure. Regulatory uncertainty, however, arose regarding how the MPesa digital currency service could be expanded without being subject to
burdensome capital and compliance costs. In 2009, the Central Bank of Kenya
responded by acknowledging that digital payment systems should not be subject
to the same requirements as banking services, which paved the way for less

115. Markus Brunnermeier et al, The Fundamental Principlesof FinancialRegulation, International
Centre for Monetary and Banking Studies, Geneva Reports on the World Economy 11, 13-32 (2009).
116 Douglas W. Arner, Janos Nathan Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, The Evolution of Fintech:A PostCrisis Paradigm?35 (Univ. of H.K Faculty of L., Rsch. Paper no 2015/047, Univ. of N. S. Wales Res.
Paper no 2016-62, 2015) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2676553 [https://perma.cc/
9EB6-8YGH].
117. MACHIAVELLO, supra note 6, at 214.
118. In 2015, a Chinese peer-to-peer lending company has revealed itself to be part of a fraudulent
scheme that misappropriated over $5.5 billion. See Emily Feng, Chinese Government Faces Peer-to-Peer
Lending Scandals Dilemma, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/c7leea4a-c19811e8-84cd-9e601db069b8 [https://perma.cc/4F9J-ENNJ].
119. Mehrotra & Yetman, supra note 3, at 88. cf. Douglas W. Arner, Ross P. Buckley & Dirk A.
Zetzsche, Fintechfor FinancialInclusion: A Frameworkfor DigitalFinancial Transformation(Univ. of
H.K. Faculty of Law, Rsch. Paper no. 2019/001) https://papers.ssrn.com/abstractid=3245287 [https://
perma.cc/4X6Y-NJKH] (stressing the need for proportionality and any regulatory response).
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onerous regulatory requirements.12 According to one study,'121 M-Pesa has raised
long-term consumption levels per capita and lifted nearly one in ten of Kenya's
poorest households out of poverty, with an even higher impact for female-headed
households. 22 In general, the emergence of digital money in Kenya has increased
financial resilience and savings. Ten years after the emergence of M-Pesa, it has
reached approximately ninety percent of the Kenyan population.1 23 The
experience of M-Pesa illustrates how a country can adopt calibrated and
proportionate regulatory measures that support digital financial inclusion
without undermining other regulatory objectives.
Finally, the principle of proportionality should also be considered in the
context of the growing use by many countries of innovative regulatory
approaches, including so-called innovation offices and regulatory sandboxes to
address the risks by digital finance.1 24 For many regulators, innovation offices are
used to improve the dialogue between regulators and financial innovators. They
may serve not only to educate innovators on the regulatory environment in which
they operate but also to improve the regulator's understanding of fintech practice
and risks, thus informing the regulator as to the appropriateness of certain
regulatory measures. Innovation offices are operated by a growing number of
regulators from developed and developing countries and can be used to facilitate
international cooperation on regulatory matters. For instance, the U.K. Financial
Conduct Authority created Project Innovate in 2014, which has entered into
cooperation arrangements with regulators in other jurisdictions in order to
promote information sharing on emerging trends in financial innovation between
authorities and to facilitate referrals of innovators from one market to another,
thus reducing regulatory barriers to entry in foreign markets. 2 5
Another regulatory innovation where the principle of proportionality can be
applied flexibly is the concept of a regulatory sandbox, involving a more formal
regulatory approach which is described in writing and published.12 The sandbox
approach allows businesses to test "innovative products, services, business
models and delivery mechanisms while ensuring that consumers are

120.
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Guild, supra note 61, at 4.
Suri & Jack, supra note 69, at 1288.
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124. See generally U.N. SEC'Y GEN.'S SPECIAL ADVOC. FOR INCLUSIVE FIN. FOR DEV.
CAMBRIDGE CTR. FOR ALT. FIN., EARLY LESSONS ON REGULATORY INNOVATIONS TO ENABLE
INCLUSIVE FINTECH: INNOVATION OFFICES, REGULATORY SANDBOXES, AND REGTECH (2019).
125.

FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INNOVATE at 8-10

(April 2019), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/the-impact-and-effectiveness-of-innovate.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V5FF-ULJF].
126. The UK Financial Conduct Authority created the first regulatory sandbox in 2016. See Financial
Conduct Authority's regulatory sandbox opens to applications, FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY (9
May
2016)
https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/financial-conduct-authority%E2%80%99sregulatory-sandbox-opens-applications [https://perma.cc/W5UG-QDUL].
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appropriately protected," subject to regulatory oversight. 2 1 Such testing occurs
on the boundaries or outside of existing regulatory frameworks, allowing
regulators and firms to experiment in order to develop a better understanding of
how new technologies work in practice and to assess which regulatory tools are
most effective. For example, the successful testing of a new technology may result
in several outcomes, including authorization of the innovation, changes in
regulation, or an order to cease certain activity. Regulatory sandboxes, however,
are resource-intensive and may therefore be inappropriate for regulators with
limited resources. An important feature of regulatory sandboxes is that they
facilitate dialogue between market participants and regulators, allowing for more
informed regulation that allows regulators to design and calibrate measures that
are proportionate for managing the risks posed by digital financial innovations.
Regulatory sandboxes are also conducive for cross-border regulatory
cooperation, which can allow innovators to scale-up more rapidly on a global or
regional basis. Different jurisdictions can utilize multi-jurisdictional sandboxes to
facilitate cross-border expansion through shared testing programs that reduce the
potential for regulatory arbitrage across national sandboxes.1 28

V
CONCLUSION

This Article argues that the principle of proportionality-as a core principle
of financial regulation and supervision in most countries-provides a framework
for understanding how national regulators can balance the various competing
interests of digital financial inclusion with other financial regulatory objectives in
order to respect local institutional and social circumstances. The principle of
proportionality creates a flexible framework for regulators-particularly in the
context of innovation offices and regulatory sandboxes-to balance the
respective interests of market participants and objectives of regulators to
determine how financial inclusion can be promoted through financial technology
solutions without undermining other vital regulatory objectives. The ISSBs'
standard setting demonstrates that the principle of proportionality has become a
general principle of banking supervision in state practice but that its application
varies widely across states, and there is a need to have local policy flexibility to
reconcile competing interests to promote financial inclusion while not
undermining other regulatory objectives. This Article suggests that the principle
of proportionality can be applied effectively in the context of regulatory
127. Id.
128. For example, two multi-jurisdictional sandboxes have been established to promote cross-border
regulatory cooperation in supervising digital financial innovations: first, the UK Financial Conduct
Authority led 9 jurisdictions in establishing the Global Financial Innovation Network (GFIN) in 2019.
See GlobalFinancialInnovation Network, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Jan. 31, 2019) https://www.fca.org.uk/
firms/innovation/global-financial-innovation-network [https://perma.cc/3WAU-UZWB]. Second, the
API Exchange (APIX), launched by the ASEAN Financial Innovation Network (AFIN). See APIX
Open Innovation Platform and Sandbox, APIX (Nov. 16, 2018) https://apixplatform.com/static/apixnews/batch55.html [https://perma.cc/ER96-PRZB].
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sandboxes, as they offer a tailored authorization process for new firms as they
test new financial technologies while allowing regulators to provide guidance and
waivers from certain requirements that may inhibit the development of useful
technologies and to coordinate with other regulators on a cross-border basis to
prevent arbitrage.

